Objectives: Multiresistantpathogens cause major clinical problems andconsiderably increase treatmentcosts. Since 2001 the Protection Against Infection Act(PIA) obligateshospitals in Germanytothe documentation of multiresistantbacteria. We analyzed the use of these data for routineinternalsurveillance. Methods: We used standarddata collected forthe mandatory documentation andstudied consecutive diagnosesofMethicillin-resistantStaphylococcus aureus (MRSA)ina893-bedtertiary level hospital in North Rhine-WestphaliainGermany. Based on the Poisson distribution forthe cumulativeyearly incidence of MRSA,wedefined athreshold levelfor an outbreak. Results: Duringa12-month time period 80 patients werediagnosedwithMRSA.The time structure and spatial distribution of different MRSA phenotypes(defined through specific antibiotic resistance patterns) were consistentwiththe within-hospital transmission. In the two preceding time periods of 12 months each, 15 respectively 8patients with MRSA werefound. The defined alert thresholdlevel forcumulative yearly incidencewas crossedinthe beginningsofthe outbreak. Conclusion: Monitoringthe mandatory datacollected on multiresistantbacteria allowsthe early detection of accumulationssuspect forthe within-hospital transmission. Thisknowledge can be usedfor afast reaction andbreakingoff the transmission chains.
Introduction
Nosocomiali nfectionsa re an increasing challengefor infectiousdiseases epidemiologyinindustrializedcountries.Multiresistantpathogens cause major clinical problems andl ead to highert reatment costs [ 1] . In 2001, an ew regulation Protection Against Infection Act (PIA)was introduced with the purposeo fi mproving the monitoring of multiresistantpathogens.According to §23 of thisl aw,t he responsible German authority (Robert-Koch-Institute,B erlin) defined12bacterialpathogens andone fungal pathogenwith resistance towards from one to sixa ntibiotics (respectivelyg roups of antibiotics) to be of special concernand to be mandatorilyrecordedbyall Germanhospitals [ 2] . This definition doesn ot distinguish between multiresistantpathogens and those thata re resistant againsto nlyo ne broad-spectruma ntibiotic. We studied the suitability of these mandatoryd ataf or the internals urveillancei nt he case of an outbreak with methicillin-resistant Staphylococcusaureus (MRSA).
Methods
During the time fromJ une 2002 to July 2003, an increased number of MRSA cases waso bservedi na893-bedt ertiary level hospital in the stateNorth Rhine-Westphalia,G ermany.W es tudiedt he mandatory data on multiresistant bacteria andanalyzed the occurrence of sames pecies with same resistance patterns in time ands patial distribution over the different wards.W hen cases appeared connected,t ransmission chains were suspected.
We definedathreshold levelfor an outbreak when the numberofobservedMRSA cases is unlikelytoresult fromadmission of patients alreadyc olonized with MRSA. Giventhe large number of patients treated in ayear in the hospitaland the lownumber of MRSA casesobservedinthe previous years, when there wasnoevidencefor an outbreak, the probability foraspecific number of MRSA casesc an be derivedf rom the Poissond istribution. The mean of the cumulative incidenceo bservedi nt wo previous time periods of 12 months is used as the mean of the Poissondistribution andp ercentilesa re calculated. The threshold is definedasthe probabilityof<5% in supporto fn ot ransmission (i.e. when only patients alreadyc olonized at admission contribute to the cumulative incidence). When an ew patienti sd iagnosed with MRSA, the numberofMRSAin12months ending on the dayo ft he newd iagnosis is calculatedand comparedwith the threshold.
Results
Between July 2002 andJ une 2003 80 patients with MRSA were observedinthe hospital unders tudy. In the twop receding 12-month periods the respective numbers were 15 and8patients.Fifty-seven of the 80 patients hadaspecific pattern of resistance (phenotype). Isolatesfrom four of these patients proved to be genotypically identical andw erec lassified as as ub-clone of "southernGermanMRSAstrain" (Witte W, nationalreference laboratoryfor Staphylococcus, We rnigerode,Germany).
Most of the cases (45 of the 57 cases with the specific phenotype) were recordedo n a14-bedsurgicalintensivecareunit (ICU). In the preceding time periodo f1 2m onths onlyt wo cases of MRSA were observed on the ICU.T or ule out that an improved detection of multiresistant pathogens was the cause for an increased incidenceo f MRSA on ICU,wecomparedthe number of bacterialspecimencollected over the period of the outbreak andd uring the preceding year.Exceptfor aslightincrease on the peak of the outbreak the numbero fs pecimen remaineds table. Similarlyt he increase in multiresistantp athogens could not be caused by an increase in the numbero f patients staying on the ICU, because these parameters remaineds table. We aren ot awareo fa ny changesi nd iagnostic standards or regime, whichc ould cause an increased detection, either.
Most of the patients with MRSA observedo no therw ards could have been infected in connection with the cluster on ICU.Some of thesepatients were for some time patients on the ICU. Othersh ad contacts with patients fromthe ICU.
In addition, analysis of allmultiresistant pathogens according to PIAhas shownthat 55 patients have been involved in clusters of bacteria with specific resistance patterns other than MRSA between July 2002 and June 2003. Therew ere2 3c ases with a multiresistantA cinetobacter baumannii (sensibility onlyt owards carbapenems). Thirty-two patients were involved in clusters of other different bacteria thatn ever containedmore than four cases. Ourfurther analysis focuses onlyonMRSA.
Besides the twop receding yearsf or whichw ec ould obtain numerical information,w ek newf rom personali nformation that the number of MRSA in previous yearsw as relatively low. Accounting fors ome underreporting we assumedt he usualnumber of MRSA casestobeat20in 12 months,this resultedinanalert threshold levelat28patients in ayear.The evolution of the outbreak in termsofcumulativeincidenceisdisplayedinFigure 1.The threshold levelw as crossed at the endo f2 002. The outbreak developed quites lowlyu pt oa peak in April 2003,untilitfinallyforced the hospitaltotakesome vigorous action:Inthe beginning of Maythe ICU wasclosed temporarilya nd allp atients with MRSA were dischargedt oo therw ards.T racking the possibleroutes of infection we almostregularlyf ound timelya nd spatialc onnections between the involved patients indicating possiblechains of transmission. An excerpt of the analysis of thesec hains focusing on the ICU for the most prevalent phenotype of MRSA in the firstweeksofthe outbreak is showninFigure 2. The spread of thisphenotype startedinthe endof2002, whichisconsistent with the observation fromthe threshold level.
Discussion
Therea re severall imitationso fo ur study. First, we did not obtain information on genotypes of the phenotypically identical bacteria exceptfor four patients.Genotyping is costly andn ot routinelyp erformedo utside of university hospitals. We limitedourselves to the readilya vailablem andatoryd ata, whichh avet he strong advantage that they existf or allh ospitalsa dhering to the PIA. Resistancepattern phenotyping is regarded to be amethod of good specificity andpoor sensitivity to distinguishdifferent bacterial clones [3, 4] .
In epidemiology of GermanMRSA, data from 2002 indicatethatprevalent genotypically determinedclones mainlydisplaydifferent resistance patterns [5, 6] . We assumedresistance patternphenotyping not to be much lesss ensitive comparedt og enotyping in thiss pecial epidemiologic situation.More problematicisthe fact thatonly fewc lones of MRSA spread in Germany (about 85% belonging to four clones [ 5] ) andquantitative data on their regional prevalence arenot available. But these data are needed to determine the discriminatorysensitivity of genotyping with regards to determination of within-hospitalt ransmission [7] .
We used the Poissond istributiont od efine the threshold levelfor an outbreak.This is associated with twonecessarydecisions, firstwith the choice of baseline yearly inci- dence, whichisregardedasnormal, second with the choice of probabilitythreshold for abnormal development. The baseline incidenceshould include onlycases prevalent at admission to fulfilthe requirementofstatistical independency. Theb aseline incidence can be derivedfrom observation of periods, wherethere is no evidenceoftransmission. Sincethe baseline incidencesimplyreflects the prevalence of MRSA at admission, screening of allpatients at admission would provide ad irect estimation.H owever, screening at admission is not performed in most hospitalsinGermany.Amoresophisticated wayt oo btain estimateso fM RSA prevalencea ta dmission can be based on mathematicalmodelling [8, 9] . This would be of special value in settingswith ahigher endemiclevel of MRSA, wheresimple observation cannot distinguish between transmission anda ccumulation of cases colonized at admission.
Thep robabilityt hreshold for abnormal development (i.e. outbreak)has to be based on clinical judgement andbalance the specificity ands ensitivity of the method. Different approaches have been proposedf or identification of abnormal patterns in occurrence of multiresistant pathogens based eithero nr athers ophisticated techniques [10 -13] or on comparison with other hospitalsi nt he samer egion [14] .The advantage of our method is itssimple useinroutine settingsb ased onlyo nt he mandatory data collected according to the PIA. It can be also used in regions with only fewhospitals,where acomparison between different hospitalsdoesnot have statistical meaning. Althoughw ed id notp resent tables for the clinical use, the threshold levels adaptedfor aspecifichospital can be simplydeveloped.
Af requentlyd iscussed problem is the issue of underreporting of multiresistant bacteria.S incew eo bservedn oc hange in the number of specimen sent to the laboratoryo veralongp eriod preceding the observedo utbreak,t here seems to be neither substantial over-detection noru nder-detection in this case, at least on the levelofthe proxy.N evertheless, in some cases the use of the samen umber of specimen could be shiftedfrom patients with lowprobabilityof colonisation to patients with higherp robability of infection.S uchp rocesses could particularlyt akep lace when the vigilance againstMRSAisincreased as during an outbreak.However this seems to have minoreffects, especially on wards wheret he diagnosticp roceduresa re highlys tandardized as on ICUs.I nt he particularc ase, microbiological monitoring wasr outinely performedt wice aw eek (tracheal secretea nd urine sampling). Forc linical purposes tracheal secreteh as the disadvantage of easy contamination by oropharyngeal flora,b ut it favors the detection of MRSA, whichnormallycolonizes noseand pharynx.
We did not distinguish between infection andc olonization with multiresistantb acteria,because both areofimportance for the transmission dynamic.
We thinkthatmonitoring andsystematical analysis of the mandatoryd atao n multiresistantp athogens can be useful for internals urveillanceo nt he hospital level. An alertthreshold can be definedbased on observationsf rom previous timep eriods. Comparedt oo thers urveillancep rograms on multiresistant bacteria,o ur approach aims to be easily applicable in almosta ll Germanhospitalsbyusing mandatoryroutine data from microbiological laboratories andarelatively simple epidemiological procedure.O bservationsf rom othero utbreaks areneeded to confirmour results.
